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Abstract
After the 2008 economic slowdown, and with increasing assault from enterprises from emerging economies, many innovative 
strategic leaders of multinational enterprises are forced to radically transform their enterprises. They often choose to 
change from low-cost strategy to innovation-driven product differentiation strategy.  In this study, we use a multi-level 
Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) and agency theory to empirically illustrate such a strategic transformation at a large 
composite fabric and accessories enterprise.  Lessons are drawn from the impact of strategic transformation at multiple 
levels: strategic leader level, tactical-team manager level, operational follower level, and stakeholder level.  Implications for 
practitioners and researchers are provided by way of mindful leader orientation and value-based innovation.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of 2008 financial recession, with a height-
ened intensity of rivalry from emerging economies, it be-
came unsustainable to pursue low-cost leadership strategy 
for many leading global enterprises such as Eastman Kodak, 
Goodyear, Timken, Nokia, General Motors, General Electric, 
and Joanne Fabrics.  A new generation of innovative lead-
ers at these global enterprises attempted to transform their 
business-level strategy from low-cost leadership strategy to 
product-differentiation strategy (Gamble and Gehani, 2013). 
With offshore outsourcing of manufacturing and service en-
terprises to low cost countries, there has been increasing 
commoditization of goods and services with shrinking profit 
margins.  
According to Porter (1980), the firms pursuing low-cost 
leadership strategy are constantly under attack from rivals 
pursuing product differentiation strategy trying to reduce 
their costs. And firms pursuing product differentiation strat-
egy may see threats from their rivals pursuing low cost 
leadership strategy trying to innovate their products.  It has, 
therefore, become imperative for the strategic leaders of 
the enterprises pursuing low-cost leadership strategy to 
transform their enterprises towards product differentiation 
strategy.  To sustain their competitive advantages, these en-
terprises must erect high barriers to entry for their rivals 
by going beyond their incremental improvements and trans-
forming themselves into radically innovating enterprises 
with protected proprietary intellectual property or unique 
distribution channels. Very few studies elaborate how in-
novative strategic leaders transform their enterprises from 
low-cost strategy to product differentiation strategy (Gam-
ble and Gehani, 2013).
Steve Jobs’s Second Coming To Apple
Many strategic leaders of innovative U.S. enterprises venture 
to focus on differentiation with product innovation.  For ex-
ample, when Apple co-founder Steve Jobs returned to Apple 
in 1997, he asserted that Apple should be producing primar-
ily differentiated and premium-priced computers instead of 
low-cost clones.  Jobs urged his tactical team managers that 
these innovative products must be well designed, well-made 
computers for the top segment of the market – just like 
luxury cars (Kahney, 2008: 31).  Jobs noted that most car 
manufacturers like Chevrolet change their products incre-
mentally from one model to the next, even though many 
customers are willing to pay premium prices for a BMW 
compared to a Chevy.  
Jobs emphasized that Apple was always under pressure to 
sell more computers at lower cost.  But he did not want Ap-
ple to compete in the low-cost computer market, which was 
a race to the bottom with commoditization.  He noted that 
the low-cost computer makers such as Compaq, Gateway, 
Acer, Lenovo, and even Dell, were making essentially similar 
commodity-like computers which competed primarily on 
low price.  
Jobs envisioned that Apple would produce top-class innova-
tive products to make enough profits to keep funding and 
developing more top-class innovative products.  And, Jobs 
was able to execute this strategic transformation success-
fully when Apple was barely three months away from bank-
ruptcy.  With this strategic transformation, the market value 
of Apple sky-rocketed from $3 billion a decade ago to $340 
billion in 2012 (Anthony and Christensen, 2012).
Innovative leaders must change continually and re-invent 
themselves from time to time.  For inspiration, Steve Jobs 
often looked to his role model Bob Dylan who refused to 
stand still and settle even when he was at the top of his 
fame (Schlender and Jobs, 1998).  Many other successful art-
ists keep doing mindlessly what made them successful in the 
first place.  They are afraid to evolve or take new risks, and 
therefore they get stale.  Jobs noted that if artists do not 
keep on risking failure, they are no more truly creative art-
ists.  Bob Dylan and Picasso were constantly risking failure.   
Kodak’s Failure To Click
A series of successive strategic leaders at Eastman Kodak 
have been not too willing to switch from their low-cost 
leadership strategy of photographic film to a more inno-
vative digital imaging based product-differentiation strategy 
(Gamble and Gehani, 2013; Gehani, 1998).  George Eastman, 
the founding-leader of Eastman Kodak, pioneered the port-
able photographic film and camera technologies in 1880s. 
These photographic film products were radical innovations 
at that time, because taking photographs conventionally 
took 6-8 hours sitting under blaring sunlight.  Taking pictures 
required using bulky and messy freshly coated light-sensitive 
glass plates.  With Eastman’s radical innovations, Kodak dom-
inated the photographic film market worldwide for many 
decades, and generated huge economies of scale and manu-
facturing speed until the 1970s.  
Gradually, other competitors, such as Fuji-Photo in Japan and 
Agfa in Germany, entered and carved out big slices of the 
global photographic film and camera markets for themselves. 
The scientists and engineers in Kodak’s research center in 
Rochester, New York invented and patented some key com-
ponents of digital imaging technology.  However, the strate-
gic leaders at Eastman Kodak were not willing to cannibalize 
even the smallest slices of their dwindling market share of 
photographic film business which still returned high profit 
margins.  
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These diverse levels of followers are closer to the custom-
ers and markets where many turbulent shifts start.  The stra-
tegic leaders in most enterprises must, therefore, rely more 
heavily on the team-level leaders and operational-level fol-
lowers to bring about any transformational changes.  Gehani 
(2002) proposed that market-oriented lateral strategic level 
leaders are more willing to interact and exchange with their 
team leaders and operational-level followers as more equal 
leaders on critical innovative projects.
Due to the paucity or generalizeability of many innovative 
strategic leaders transforming their enterprises pursuing 
low-cost leadership strategy into innovative product differ-
entiation strategy, it is impractical to use a cross-sectional 
quantitative analysis.  Therefore, we will illustrate the key 
concepts by using an empirical qualitative longitudinal study 
of the process of strategic transformation process at a com-
posite of a large family-owned privately held U.S. enterprise. 
In This Research Study
To explore how innovative strategic leaders can effectively 
and efficiently transform their enterprises pursuing low-cost 
leadership strategy to switch to relying on product innova-
tion driven strategy, we illustrate by examining and analyz-
ing the practices and experiences of a composite privately 
held large textile company Fabrick Co. (the actual name of 
the companies in the composite enterprise are withheld for 
confidentiality reasons).  Fabrick Co. is based in the Mid-
Western region of the United States, with annual revenues 
of more than $3 billion in 2012.  Over 9,600 employees 
working in three strategic business unit divisions and four 
functional departments of Fabrick Co supplied more than 
120,000 different SKUs of fabrics and other accessories to 
a wide variety of large apparel retailers like Limited, Gap, 
Abrocombie & Fitch, Chico, Anthropologie, and others.  
In the past, the strategic leaders at Fabrick Co were tradi-
tionally quite successful in growing the company by pursu-
ing low-cost leadership strategy.  However, with the recent 
deregulation of international textile trade and elimination of 
national textile quotas, there has been a surge in low-cost 
imports to the U.S. and Western Europe from China, India, 
Thailand and other low-cost countries.  As a result, the stra-
tegic governance and the board of directors of the Fabrick 
Co. have been forced to consider migrating the enterprise 
to innovation driven product differentiation strategy.
Over the past three decades, Fabrick Co. first grew organi-
cally from within, and then grew inorganically by acquisitions. 
The company was originally founded in the 1970s by a highly 
innovative leader who supplied specialty fabrics to exclusive 
clients.  During the 1980s and 1990s, Fabrick Co. acquired 
and consolidated a number of struggling rival fabric suppli-
In 1981, Sony entered the photo-imaging market by launch-
ing a disruptive radical innovation in the form of Mavica 
digital camera. Sony’s early digital camera was expensive and 
with low image resolution.  But the digital images captured 
by Mavica offered unique competitive advantages with their 
ability to be stored, manipulated, and transmitted easily over 
long distances.  Gradually, the price of digital cameras came 
down significantly and the quality of digital images went up 
remarkably.  Many successive strategic leaders at Kodak con-
tinued to deny the accelerating assault of innovative digital 
imaging products on photographic film markets (Gamble 
and Gehani, 2013).  They refused to switch from pursuing 
low-cost mass-market leadership, and transforming to prod-
uct-innovation driven differentiated strategy.  This lack of 
willingness to change with the shifting market competition 
led Kodak towards declaration of chapter – 11 bankruptcy 
in 2012 (Gamble and Gehani, 2013).      
Multi – Level Transformation
Many strategic leaders prefer to make incremental trans-
actional changes with low risk levels.  They rely heavily on 
doing business-as-usual by becoming lean, reducing waste, or 
by outsourcing offshore, to reduce their costs and improve 
their profits incrementally. These cost-cutting efforts, as in 
the case of Eastman Kodak, are accompanied by periodic lay-
offs of large number of employees – with or without signifi-
cant improvements in productivity (Gehani, 2008).  Pursuit of 
radical transformation and disruptive organizational change 
from low-cost leadership strategy to product-differentiation 
strategy, on the other hand, requires not only an innovative 
strategic leader but also a genuine buy-in from agile team-
leaders, operational followers, and responsive stakeholders. 
Evolving Leader-Member-Exchange
More than ten years earlier, Gehani (2002) noted that the 
turbulent global markets in the 1990s, after the fall of many 
state-owned communist economies in 1989, demanded an 
evolution of leader-member exchange (LMX) relationship 
between innovative strategic leaders and their multiple levels 
of followers.  Such mega shifts in global market environments 
demanded new strategic leadership approaches (Fukuyama, 
1999).  Traditionally, many high performing enterprises have 
relied on either charismatic or transactional leaders (Bass 
and Avalio, 1994; Nadler and Tushman, 1990).  As the market 
environments become more turbulent with disequilibrium 
(D’Aveni, 1994; 1999), the transactional or charismatic lead-
ers do not have the required dynamic capabilities to sustain 
their competitive advantages.  These strategic leaders have 
to increasingly rely on their boundary-spanning team leaders 
and operational-level followers.  
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Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  Such generation, 
collection, and qualitative analysis of observations has more 
applicability (than more common quantitative research stud-
ies) for many management practitioners as well as business 
educators (Turner, 1983).  In this context, it is generally ac-
cepted by many researchers that it is impossible to carry out 
any research study without some guidance from previous 
theoretical frameworks (Melnyk, Hanson, and Calantone. 
2010).  We, therefore, frame our empirical research study in 
the context of two basic theoretical frameworks described 
below.  These two frameworks are in addition to the evolv-
ing LMX theory perspective mentioned before.
We use in this study a multi-level approach by examining 
the execution of product innovation strategy at not only 
a strategic leader level, but also at a follower team-leader 
level, at an operational operator level, and at stakeholder 
level.  Multiple extended interviews are required at each 
level.  Each interview must follow a prescribed case-study 
protocol. Multiple interviewers are often used for each in-
terview for robustness and to avoid subjective biases.  This 
is supplemented with information gathered from secondary 
sources. The stories people at different levels share may not 
always clearly provide their reasons, but these stories pro-
vide clear glimpses of what drives their behaviors. 
Such multi-level approach has been found to be superior 
than a single-level approach often used that erroneously as-
sumes that a radical product innovation can be appropriated 
primarily to the efforts of a visionary strategic leader (or an 
agile follower, or a responsive stakeholder such as an innova-
tive supplier).  Many observers in popular media, and some 
researchers, have erroneously attributed the series of Ap-
ple’s radical product innovations such as iMac, iPod, iTunes, 
iPhone, and iPad primarily to the visionary leadership of Ap-
ple co-founder Steve Jobs (Kahney, 2008).  Very little efforts 
were devoted to study the roles and contributions of team-
leaders, operators, and stakeholders.
  
This research study also relies on agency theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989), which postulates interactions between principals and 
agents.  In this research study, a strategic leader as a principal 
sets a vision and the over-arching goals for the enterprise to 
be innovative, but the strategic leader alone cannot imple-
ment these transformational changes.  The implementation 
and execution of the strategic leader’s vision and goals be-
come the primary responsibility of the agents or the follow-
ers, such as tactical team leaders and operational-level fol-
lowers.  The interactions, trust, and the contracts between 
the principal innovative strategic leader and the inspired 
follower agents play critical roles in the timely completion 
of the transformation and market launch of radical product 
innovations. 
ers who were unable to sustain their competitiveness in an 
increasingly intense competitive market.  As a result of these 
acquisitions and consolidations, the company started grow-
ing in the early 2000s by primarily pursuing low-cost leader-
ship strategy.  
The acquisitions were integrated and the company was re-
structured into three divisions: the whole-sale fabric divi-
sion, the retail fabric division, and the accessories division. 
These divisions were supported by four departments: mar-
keting and distribution department, information technology 
department, finance and accounting department, and human 
talent management department.  A number of different con-
sultants were retained to help implement lean production 
practices.  Six-sigma projects for waste reduction were en-
couraged and incentivized across the three divisions and the 
four supportive departments of Fabrick Co. enterprise.  A 
low-cost leadership culture was ingrained deeply and widely. 
Since the 2008 financial recession, however, it became hard 
to sustain Fabrick’s growth momentum with low-cost lead-
ership strategy - which yielded diminishing returns.  Many of 
Fabrick Co.’s major customers developed alternate global 
sources in China and India, and developed them as alternate 
suppliers of competing product lines.  The Fabrick Co. board 
of directors and family owners decided that its low-cost 
leadership strategy was shrinking its earnings rapidly.  This 
strategy had become counter-productive to its growth, and 
therefore it was no longer sustainable.  The company’s board 
asked the previous CEO to step-up as chairman in January 
2009, and appointed a new CEO from outside.  
CEO Angela Jones was hired from a highly innovative cloth-
ing retailer, a major potential customer of Fabrick Co.  Her 
mandate was to transform Fabrick Co. into a product inno-
vation driven enterprise.  Her performance bonus was tied 
to top-line revenue growth, as well as the percent sales and 
profit margins from new radically innovative products she 
would launch.  She was offered a significant stock option, 
which would be vested after a substantial increase in sales 
and earnings. Her ‘skin was in the game.’    
 
Research Method Used
The primary focus of this qualitative research study is to 
carefully examine and illustrate the processes involved in 
a strategic leader’s conscious strategic transformation of a 
large established enterprise from pursuing low-cost leader-
ship strategy to product-differentiation strategy. 
This research study is based on Grounded Theory Method-
ology (GTM), which predicates a rigorous quantitative inter-
pretation of empirical observations and data by organizing 
these into an exploratory theoretical framework (Glaser and 
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tries.  Jones did not seem to be impressed.  The leader from 
the Human Talent department offered a declining morale in 
employees as the cause of the company’s fall.  They were 
expecting Jones to blame the division and department team-
leaders for the deteriorating financial condition.  Instead, 
Jones blasted: OUR PRODUCTS DON’T SELL BECAUSE 
THEY TURNED INTO COMMODITIES.
Jones listed how as the chief buyer for a major retail chain 
she had noted, more than five years before the onset of 
the 2008 financial crisis, a steady decline in the quality of 
Fabrick Co. products and after-sales service.  She felt that 
whereas Fabrick Co. offered more and more lines of prod-
ucts, very few of these products stood apart from the com-
modity goods coming out of China.  Jones had frequently 
visited India, and saw some amazing fabrics and accessories 
based on the long-held historical traditions of India.  Many of 
these products were made from natural fibers and renew-
able sources (rather than petroleum oil-based plastics and 
synthetic fibers used in the products produced in China). 
She felt that with the growing awareness for climate change 
and environmental protection among many of their high-end 
customers, the time had come to introduce to them some 
innovative natural fabrics modified with the latest develop-
ments in new emerging technologies.   
These green product innovations would leverage the lat-
est developments in the emerging environmental-friendly 
technologies such as nano technology and new thin-film 
surface-coating treatments.  Nano technology allows use of 
significantly smaller quantities of natural dyes and additives 
to dramatically enhance the performance characteristics of 
many natural fibers, fabrics, and accessories.  New advances 
in thin-film surface coating technologies can help treat the 
fabrics made from natural fibers to make them odor, mold, 
and stain resistant.  The treated fabrics would have wicking 
properties to absorb sweat and leave behind a feeling of 
freshness with clean dry skin.  Odorless clothing has a huge 
market potential in the hunter clothing market.
CEO Jones knew that launching a series of innovative green 
products, based on the latest developments in nano and thin-
film surface treatment technologies, would not be sufficient 
to quickly change the customers’ perception about Fabrick 
Co.  There was a deeply ingrained image of Fabrick Co. as a 
low-cost supplier of commodity goods.  She, therefore, pro-
posed a new $3 million company-wide advertising campaign 
promoting environmental protection.  This would start with 
multiple 30 second spots in the National Basketball March 
Madness broadcasts.  She created the fifth department of 
Corporate Reputation, and entrusted it to a newly hired dy-
namic brand promoter who had worked with Angela Jones 
in her previous company.     
Critical Observations and Lessons Learned
As mentioned before, the illustrative information and the 
observations were gathered at four different levels:  (1) stra-
tegic leader-level, (2) tactical team-manager level, (3) opera-
tional follower level, and (4) a stakeholder customer/sup-
plier level.  Given below are the lessons drawn from such 
observations and gathered information.
Lessons At Strategic Leader – Level:
Using Innovative Mindfulness 
In order for a low-cost strategy driven enterprise to trans-
form into an innovative product-differentiation driven en-
terprise, it needs an innovative strategic leader who envi-
sions and champions the strategic transformation of the 
enterprise from the highest level.  The innovative strategic 
leader has to be a front-end creative artist, as well as a back-
end inspiring entrepreneur.  The strategic innovative leaders 
must identify fleeting new opportunities and capture these 
effectively and efficiently.  The innovative strategic leader 
must be not only a transformational leader with top-down 
envisioning, but also a servant leader facilitating bottom-up 
nurturing of the followers.  Based on our direct observa-
tions and gathered information, transforming an enterprise 
from low-cost leadership strategy to a product innovation 
driven strategy requires the following key initiatives from 
the highest-level of the enterprise.
 
Investing in New Technology To Innovate Traditional 
Products
Soon after taking over, CEO Angela Jones took three months 
to visit all the divisions and carefully observe the practices in 
different divisions.  She noted that Fabrick Co. was in a steep 
downward spiral.    She carefully examined all the products 
Fabrick Co. sold.  In the past three years, Fabrick Co. had 
slowly degenerated to become a me-too fabric and acces-
sory supplier.  As fewer and fewer customers were buying 
the commoditized product lines it offered, the company was 
rapidly bleeding cash and losing market share.  The investors 
and family owners were unhappy, and the company’s debt 
rating was slipping down into the basement.  It was merely 
three months away from bankruptcy.  
One day CEO Jones called a meeting of the tactical leaders 
of all the three divisions and the four supporting depart-
ments in her office.  She wrote down on a white board in 
big letters: WHAT IS WRONG WITH FABRICK CO.?  The 
division and department leaders shuffled their feet wait-
ing for the axe to fall on their heads.  Someone mentioned 
financial recession.  Another divisional leader pointed out 
to the escalating global competition from low-cost coun-
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To avoid such distraction, often radical innovation projects 
are isolated and located away from the rest of a well-estab-
lished enterprise (Markides, 2006).  For example, in 1980, 
when the strategic leaders at IBM decided to compete with 
Apple by entering the personal computer (PC) market, they 
located their PC skunk-works to Florida, far away from IBM’s 
headquarters in upstate New York (Gehani, 1998). 
During the past 10 years, the Emerging Business Opportuni-
ties (EBO) program has helped IBM gain significant growth 
and innovative success with networked data storage and 
blade servers (Anthony and Christensen, 2012).  One key 
driver of this innovative success was that the EBO team 
leaders were evaluated by not just their financial returns, 
but primarily by whether these team managers learned from 
early failures and responded adaptively in a timely manner.
For many well-established enterprises and strategic lead-
ers, it is often hard to walk away from relying on their con-
ventional cost-cutting strategies and performance metrics. 
Even the most innovative strategic leaders and enterprises 
cannot ignore reducing the cost of their innovative products 
in order to stay competitive with their cost – leadership 
rivals.  Short-term cost cutting often must run side by side 
with long-term radical innovation. However, prior reliance 
and success with incremental improvements has been ob-
served to be negatively correlated with a successful pursuit 
of radical innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2003).   
Leveraging Crisis to Speed-up Change and Buy-in
In this context of facilitating change, a crisis (either real or 
fabricated by a strategic leader) can help an innovative lead-
er transform an enterprise from pursuing cost-cutting goals 
to radical product innovation goals.  (Carmeli and Schau-
boeck, 2008; Kim, 1998).
Considering the dire financial circumstances under which 
CEO Jones was 
hired from outside, the strategic leader used the financial 
crisis to gain a buy-in and a speedier change from her lower-
level followers and external stake-holders.  Jones felt that 
the crisis situation helped her layoff almost 3,300 out of 
9,600 employees.  Another 450 employees were furloughed 
for temporary periods.  She also hand-picked 30 highly crea-
tive employees and moved them into the fourth new Green 
Innovation Fabrics and Accessories Division she started.  A 
number of other cost-saving methods related to travel, vaca-
tions, and pensions were instituted without much resistance 
because of the impending crisis situation.  
Focus on the Select Few
One of the first few things Jones wanted to do was to re-
focus Fabrick Co.  She noted that over the past few years, 
Fabrick Co. had spread too widely into 120,000 different 
product lines of fabrics and accessories in a wide variety of 
price ranges.  Servicing their major customers with all these 
multiple lines required heavy inventories, estimated at $360 
million a year.  In the past, Fabrick Co. frequently wrote-
off large amounts for unsold or obsolete inventories.  CEO 
Jones decided to eliminate the low-end product lines, and 
retain only the high-end 75,000 specialty product lines and 
accessories.  She solicited all the Frederick Co. employees 
to suggest the select few product lines that need to be re-
tained.  For any lines that a division wanted to keep, it had to 
make a business case why it must be retained based on its 
earnings contribution and profit margin.  The division heads 
had to prove to Jones that a particular product line had a 
sustainable competitive advantage, based on either a unique 
technological edge or a close customer relationship. 
This exercise for slashing-and-burning unneeded product 
lines lasted day after day for about six weeks.  Jones listened 
calmly, and asked many questions:  
A. How was the product produced?  
B. How was it marketed?  
C. What would they do if the budget was doubled or halved? 
D. How did the product line align and contribute to the in-
novation driven business strategy of the firm?  
She was mindfully reflective.  She urged everyone at Fabrick 
Co. to focus, and retain only what they were best at offering. 
Finally, when the dust settled, the reduction in product lines 
substantially decreased the need to maintain heavy inven-
tories.  The inventory levels came down from $360 million 
to $150 million within a year.  This boosted the earnings 
significantly by $63 million at the end of the year.  This was 
a great immediate reward.  But what would sustain such 
success next?
  
Balancing the Role of Performance Outcome Goals
There is a paradoxical challenge for innovative strate-
gic leaders in balancing the relationship between inspiring 
product innovation, and setting clear performance outcome 
goals.  On one hand, the Goal-setting Theory proposes that 
performance of an enterprise is positively correlated with 
the articulation of precise goals (Locke and Latham, 1990). 
Setting performance standards clearly communicates across 
the enterprise what is needed, and how incentives are ap-
propriated in alignment with the specified performance 
goals (Melnyk and Stewart, 2004).  On the other hand, it has 
been often found empirically that an over-emphasis of goals 
hampers encouragement of innovation.  
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The limited comprehension may also apply to the shifting 
performance metrics.  Whereas the cost-leadership strategy 
measures performance by the unit cost and profit margin 
metrics, the ‘newness’ in product innovation is hard to as-
sess.  Many hard to answer questions arise:
A. Is a product just incrementally improved, or is it a radical 
new product?  
B. Who determines that difference?  
C. Will the customers fully comprehend the innovative 
products that they have not seen yet?
D. Will the targeted customers be willing to pay premium 
prices for the differentiated ‘newness’?  
Whereas the tactical team managers knew the conventional 
fabric treatments that improve the performance and utility 
of a textile fabric, these managers required much deeper 
comprehension of nano technology and how this would 
radically innovate the performance of natural textile fabrics. 
Some of the newly invented thin-film surface treatments are 
far more sophisticated and complex than the conventional 
treatments used for synthetic textiles.    
Limited Trust and Buy-In
The mindless rut and a limited comprehension mentioned 
above can often lead to a limited buy-in by the senior man-
agers and tactical team leaders.  Some tactical team-leaders 
may want to seriously question if the innovation-driven 
product differentiated strategy is relevant or even financially 
viable for the traditional and mature goods such as textile 
fabrics for apparel.  This resistance is likely to be more in-
tense from the product divisions which still have substan-
tial market shares and profit margins.  A similar resistance 
and limited buy-in of team leaders was observed at Eastman 
Kodak as many of the senior managers in the photographic 
film division with high market shares and profit margin re-
mained skeptic for too long about the need to switch more 
aggressively to more innovative digital imaging (Gamble and 
Gehani, 2013).  The leaders of market segments often fail to 
see the need to change, or to ‘fix’ what does not seem to 
be broken.  
Some resistors to change or innovate radically deny that 
there can be any radical innovations in traditional industries 
such as clothing.  These managers assert that people have 
been using clothing for centuries, and therefore it is hard to 
introduce anything radically different.  Others feel that cost-
cutting and incremental improvements still have long way to 
produce good financial results, and that radical innovations 
may be too risky or unpredictable for a firm with serious 
financial constraints.  They view the risk-to-reward relation-
ships in radical product innovations very differently from the 
way their strategic leader sees these.  
Lessons From Tactical-Level 
Divisional Managers
Typically, at the senior manager level in an enterprise one 
observes a resistance to change often involved with a radi-
cal innovation.  This resistance to change may result in either 
obstruction or overt unwillingness to implement the strate-
gic leader’s new vision.  There are a number of key lessons 
to mitigate such lack of support for the strategic innovative 
change mandated from above.
Mindless Rut and Status Quo
Some divisional-level team leaders are too complacent to 
change because they are stuck in a mindless rut.  They are 
comfortable doing the same familiar thing over and over 
again that they have been doing over the past many years. 
They may not be awake to their likes and dislikes, and they 
are not aware of the shifting opportunities in the market-
place.  They know how to cut costs, but they are afraid of 
taking risks to pursue radical new innovations. They know 
that the old way of low-cost leadership was not working 
any more.  But they also may not know how the proposed 
new way of pursuing product innovations would pay off rich 
dividends to the company, and to themselves personally.  
Many of these older managers are also somewhat scared 
that the new innovative ways would put them at a com-
petitive disadvantage relative to the new younger employ-
ees who are less hardened, and more open to creative new 
ideas.  The older managers tend not to have the Internet and 
digital multi-media savvy of the younger generation employ-
ees.  The younger employees are often much better at find-
ing answers to any new questions that arise related to the 
new product innovations.  At times the older division-heads 
wonder if the younger seemingly clueless generation even 
knows what they do not know.      
 
Limited Comprehension
Limited comprehension is another common source of resist-
ance to change and organizational transformation.  Whereas 
the leader at the highest strategic level may have a clear view 
of the innovative disruptive new vision, this innovative vision 
may not be fully or clearly communicated to the middle-
level managers who are expected to execute the strategic 
leader’s innovative vision.  Whereas the strategic leader at 
the top is clearly aware of the need to develop and market 
radical product innovations that are new to the textiles in-
dustry, the divisional-level managers may not be tacitly aware 
of these implicit requirements new to the industry and new 
to the company. 
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company’s strategic transformation from low-cost strategy 
to product-innovation driven differentiated strategy as in-
convenience and irksome.  They may suffer from some of 
the same challenges as noted earlier for the tactical-level 
team-leaders and divisional managers.
Mindless Rut and Resistance to Change
Like the tactical-level team leaders and divisional managers, 
operational level followers may also feel more comfortable 
in doing what has been specified and negotiated from one 
collective bargaining contract to the next by their guilds or 
unions (in union shop enterprises).  The operational level 
workers, who are members of unions, may be even more 
rigid in switching to any new innovative tasks, or trying some 
innovative new ways.  We have heard older staff members 
used to filling paper forms resist using computers for filling 
forms online. 
Limited Comprehension
Reducing cost or eliminating waste, to improve efficiency or 
be more lean, are fairly straight-forward guidelines for most 
operational-level employees to follow.  ‘Be innovative’ or ‘be 
more customer-responsive’ are much more abstract ideas 
to comprehend for many operational – level employees.  The 
operations – level followers need more precise distinction 
between incremental improvements and radical innovations. 
Their strategic leaders or tactical-level division managers set 
over-arching goals to be radically innovative.  This may not 
help the operations-level followers to figure out how to go 
about accomplishing such over-arching goals.  Many of these 
followers may continue to use currently used procedures, 
with very limited innovative outcomes.    
Limited Buy-In
Most operational-level followers are often paid by piece-
rates.  They rarely receive any incentives to try out fuzzy new 
innovative ways.   Such innovative new ways often reduce 
their outputs and productivity, and thereby their take-home 
pay.  Many operators are willing to try out new innovative 
ways while they are paid to work, as long as their take-home 
pay is either not reduced, or it is somewhat increased.  The 
innovative new products produced as per customers’ orders, 
often have shorter production runs and larger inventory lev-
els than the more commoditized older mature products and 
accessories.  Switching from low-cost commodity products 
(like photographic film in Eastman Kodak) to radically inno-
vative products (such as digital imaging for Eastman Kodak) 
also represents a shift in the power and influence of the 
different operational-level followers with different training 
backgrounds.  At Fabrick Co. the operation – level followers 
were expected to build their competencies in environmen-
tally sustainable green products and processes.  
Time Lags 
Radical product innovations also involve unpredictable 
large time lags between deployment of financial and tempo-
ral resources (as in design, feasibility studies, or prototype 
making), and the accrual of benefits (as in gaining market 
share, or higher profit margin).  Many conventional manag-
ers prefer their age-old reliance on process-based produc-
tivity improvements over making radical new bets in new 
untested market segments.  They also fear that initially their 
own performance, and performance-based incentives, may 
suffer because of the initial investments required in front-
end exploration, trials, and market tests needed to develop 
and launch radical product innovations.
Radical innovations also require patience and persistence. 
Market success is not likely to happen with innovations 
overnight.  Gaining market penetration and customer ac-
ceptance takes significantly large amounts of time.  Instant 
block-buster successes are rare.  Senior-level managers may 
need to re-learn and be willing to postpone their satisfac-
tion and gratification from their short-term efforts and in-
vestments – especially when they can least afford to do so 
because of their financial and time constraints.
Unwillingness to Risk and Fail
As we noted before in the introduction section, innovative 
strategic leaders and tactical team-level managers must be 
willing to fail, learn from their failures, and resiliently move 
on.  Steve Jobs looked up to Bob Dylan and Picasso as the 
innovative artists who were willing to fail again and again 
while attempting to innovate.  Unfortunately, after the 2008 
recession, very few firms had the financial slack or the will 
to accept failure.  Sometimes, they did not have the process 
flexibility needed to produce radical product innovations. 
Or they may not have the financial resources needed to 
purchase, install, and commission more flexible production 
facilities to produce the proposed product innovations.
Some firms are also not ready to succeed from their radi-
cal innovations.  If their innovations become successful, they 
require substantially additional resources to capitalize from 
their breakthrough success.  They may not have such re-
sources to invest in capacity building.  With lack of slack 
resources, some managers may be afraid to get trapped in 
the ‘valley of death.’ This realization of euphoria of success 
mixed with anxiety to scale up can easily cause strategic dis-
sonance (Burgelman and Grove, 1996).
Lessons From Operations – Level Followers
The operational-level followers are far more specialized in 
their functions than their upper level leaders. They see their 
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make these useful in practice.  Stakeholders not only include 
those entities that support the enterprise (Freeman and 
Reed, 1983), but also those entities that are affected by the 
organization (Cross and Prusak, 2002).  
Strategic leaders and tactical-team managers need to man-
age the dynamic influences of their external stakeholders 
effectively in order to realize their  intended strategic trans-
formation from relying on low-cost strategy to innovation 
driven strategy (Cummings and Doh, 2000).  According to 
Porter (1980), two key groups of stakeholders whose bar-
gaining powers significantly impact the potential profits of an 
enterprise are buyers and suppliers.  The dynamic influences 
of these stakeholders are discussed below.
Courting the Customers
CEO Jones’s innovation-differentiated strategy demanded a 
close courting of key customers and buyers.  Jones started a 
detailed sales-driven planning process, whereby the key cus-
tomers’ changing preferences and requirements drove the 
capacity monitoring and capacity building initiatives within 
Fabrick Co.  Using an A – B – C analysis, a new sales pro-
tocol had to be developed.  The major A – level customers 
generating the highest sales revenue were to be contacted 
almost every day.  The medium B – level customers, with 
somewhat lesser but still significant sales volumes, were to 
be contacted once a week.  And, the C – level customers, 
ordering primarily commodity – like products were to be 
contacted once in two weeks.  The salesmen at Fabrick Co. 
were screened and ranked based on their empathy and per-
sistence, rather than on their aggressive persuasiveness in 
selling.  The most empathetic and persistent salesmen were 
assigned the A – level clients and major accounts.  
All the salesmen at Fabrick Co. needed to be retrained to 
switch from relying on traditional transactional selling, to re-
lying more on relational selling.  In transactional selling, the 
Fabrick salesmen focused on ‘asking for the order’ and ‘clos-
ing the deal.’  In relational selling, the retrained salesmen fo-
cused on the customers’ ‘pain’ in sustaining their profits and 
competitive advantages, and tried to offer sales solutions to 
mitigate such pain.  
This change took substantial time for the Fabrick Co. sales-
men to earn and build trust of the key customers.  First, 
some past learning had to be unlearned.  In the past, some 
Fabrick Co. salesmen had been often times inconsistent in 
making their promised deliveries.  They had monitored ship-
ments at their end, and often did not follow when these 
shipments arrived at the customers’ warehouses.  This had 
upset many customers and caused a lot of lost sales.  Only a 
consistent track record of delivering as promised, time after 
time, would help improve the trust level of the customers.
Skill Lags
More than the time-lags, the operational-level followers are 
more likely to be concerned with a lag in their skills and edu-
cation that they must have to produce radically innovative 
products.  For example, at Kodak, the value of chemists and 
chemical engineers producing photographic film declined at 
the expense of a growing influence of employees with com-
puter science and electronics background producing digital 
imaging products.  At Fabrick Co., there was a growing need 
for the employees with expertise in nano technology and 
thin-film surface coating technology.  This shifted the influ-
ence and performance from textile engineers and buyers to 
chemists and chemical engineers familiar with nano technol-
ogy and thin-film surface technology.
Unwillingness to Risk and Fail
Finally, there is a bigger resistance to try out new ways and 
new means among operators in order to produce innovative 
new environment-friendly green products.  The operations-
level followers must touch and use the new materials, and 
deliver a consistently high productivity as well as a high qual-
ity.  This requires a lot of trial and error at the operations 
level.  Fabrick Co. required a new culture where risk taking 
was encouraged, and failures were tolerated.  In the past, 
there was a mature rigid culture where costly failures were 
looked down upon and often punished.  CEO Jones must 
work hard to define and clearly communicate a new culture 
and a new compensation system promoting innovation.
In addition to building a new culture, the compensation and 
incentives for operators must be realigned to the overall 
strategic mission to be innovative and environment – friend-
ly.  Most operators tend to behave to maximize their eco-
nomic and psychic utility.  Therefore, their compensations 
and incentives must be carefully realigned to the overall cor-
porate strategy.  In addition to such rewards, new programs 
are needed for recognition of the operators who suggest 
and adopt innovative ideas.  Some of the best practices can 
be adopted from Japanese enterprises such as Honda and 
Toyota, where each employee suggests more than 200 sug-
gestions per year (Gehani, 1998). 
Lessons From Stake-Holder Level:
Courting Customers And Engaging Suppliers
A strategic transformation involves balancing the multiple 
demands of an organization’s different stakeholders as re-
lated to the strategic leader’s new innovation driven strate-
gic goals.  According to Ackerman and Eden (2011), whereas 
there is extensive literature that discusses management of 
stakeholders, the key concepts are not well developed to 
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Many employees, at tactical team manager level or at opera-
tional follower level, wear masks (or an artificial persona) 
most of the time that they are at work.  During crises situ-
ations, these masks come off, and the frustrated angry em-
ployees, either team-leaders or operational followers, peek 
from underneath their masks.  Mindful innovative leaders 
seek their followers’ authentic core capabilities and persona 
to craft their innovative visions (Klein and Izzo, 1998).  They 
balance their top-down envisioning with a nurturing of bot-
tom-up entrepreneuring by their followers. 
From Product Differentiated Innovation To Value 
Driven Innovation
Furthermore, is this strategic transformation always need-
ed?  Must all innovative strategic leaders make highly disrup-
tive transformational changes from low-cost leadership to 
innovative product-differentiated strategy?  Must these en-
terprises shed their long-held cost-cutting cultures to cre-
ate and adopt an altogether new innovation-driven culture 
based on premium-priced differentiated products? Would all 
of these enterprises make such drastic transformation suc-
cessfully? 
Value-based innovation may be a more practical and less dis-
ruptive alternative for strategic leaders seeking to gain sus-
tainable competitive advantage.  The recently retired chair-
man Ratan Tata of India’s large conglomerate Tata Group, 
proposed a value-based innovative Nano mini-car for esti-
mated 900 hundred million potential new customers at the 
‘bottom of the economic pyramid’ in India and in other parts 
of the world (Gehani, 2013).  The Tata Nano mini-car costs 
only Indian rupees 100,000 or US$ 2,200 (in 2008 currency 
exchange rate), and provides a safe water-proof mode of 
transportation for the families of bottom-of-the-pyramid 
customers.  The innovative strategic leader Ratan Tata re-
sisted the attempt for Tata Motors to rely exclusively on 
the premium-priced product innovations (such as Jaguar and 
Land Rover brands he acquired from Ford in 2008).  
Many other value-based product innovations, such as Jaipur 
prosthetic foot, Southwest Airlines, and computer-based 
animation film Toy Story are other examples of successful 
transformation of innovative enterprises (Thompson et al., 
2013).  These enterprises retained their core DNA of cost-
cutting cultures, and blended these with the state-of-the art 
innovation.  Strategic leaders may, therefore, consider pur-
suing value-based innovation strategy instead of rushing to 




The new innovation-differentiated products relied heav-
ily on an intimate engagement of key suppliers.  Specialized 
and exclusive suppliers were identified, carefully screened, 
and sourced in India.  Instead of the hands-off relationships 
that Fabrick Co. had with many suppliers in the past, a more 
partnership like relationship was cultivated with the select-
ed fewer strategic suppliers.  In the past, Fabrick Co. used 
900 suppliers to service their 120,000 product lines.  This 
was carefully whittled down to 150 key suppliers servicing 
60,000 product lines.
The craftsmen and owners of the cottage industry of India 
making the differentiated natural fabrics and accessories for 
Fabrick Co., had to be retrained in quality assurance. They 
needed to be significantly scaled up for economies of scale. 
None of these exotic natural goods were currently being 
offered by Fabrick Co. or its key rivals.  CEO Jones shared 
with the tactical team-leaders that she saw a huge market 
potential in launching such green product innovations. She, 
therefore, proposed to start the new Green Fabrics and Ac-
cessories division, primarily developing radical new products 
based on renewable natural and bio-degradable resources. 
This fourth division was charged to account for about 30% 
of the total sales revenue of Fabrick Co. in five years.   
Implications For Practitioners And Research
This research study has empirically illustrated what takes 
place when an innovative strategic leader attempts to trans-
form an enterprise relying on low-cost leadership strategy 
into an enterprise driven by innovative product differentiat-
ed strategy.  To do so effectively, how must strategic leaders 
change their relationship with their multi-level followers?
Patterns of a Leader’s Influence
Gehani (2011) has noted that innovative strategic lead-
ers follow a pattern of five different orientations to influ-
ence their followers’ creativity and innovation. This study 
elaborated on the characteristics of an innovative strategic 
leader’s (1) position orientation, (2) partnership orientation, 
(3) production task orientation, (4) people’s development 
orientation, and (5) personhood mindful orientation.  With 
dynamic hyper-intensive markets, and increasingly innova-
tion-driven global competition, strategic leaders may need 
to evolve from the fourth-level servant leaders facilitating 
team-leaders and operations-level followers in a relatively 
predictable market environment (Greenleaf, 1977), to the 
fifth-level mindful lateral leaders.  
The mindful innovative leaders influence their followers by 
respecting the authenticity of their followers’ personhood. 
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